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Abstract
Randomness beacons are services that periodically emit a random number, allowing users
to base decisions on the same random value without trusting anyone: ideally, the random-
ness beacon does not only produce unpredictable values, but is also of low computational
complexity for the users, bias-resistant and publicly verifiable. Such randomness beacons
can serve as an important primitive for smart contracts in a variety of contexts. This paper
first presents a structured security analysis, based on which we then design, implement,
and evaluate a trustworthy and efficient randomness beacon. Our approach does not
require users to register or run any computationally intensive operations. We then compare
different implementation and deployment options on distributed ledgers, and report on an
Ethereum smart contract-based lottery using our beacon.
1 Introduction
A randomness beacon is a service emitting unpredictable random values at regular intervals,
defined in 1983 by Michael O. Rabin who used it to add probabilistic security in several proto-
cols [1]. Randomness beacons can help a group of users to agree on some random outcome,
even though they do not trust each other. In particular, the main purpose of the randomness
beacon is not to produce “better” local random numbers than, e.g., using /dev/urandom; it
allows users to agree on the same random value. Randomness beacons come with many appli-
cations, e.g., in cryptographic, security, and distributed systems protocols. Example applica-
tions include generation of protocol parameters and seeding elliptic curves [2, 3], privacy
preserving messaging [4–6], anonymous browsing [7–9], electronic voting and secure elec-
tions [9], gambling and lottery services, or preventing selfish mining [10–12]. Randomness
beacons are considered a “tool of democracy” [2].
Not surprisingly, there is an abundance of approaches for the design of publicly-verifiable,
bias-resistant and unpredictable randomness beacons. There are two main strands of beacon
research with different computational requirements on the users. One type of beacons require
a beacon operator which provides its users with random values. In such approaches, the bea-
con operator bears the main computational burden. In the second type of design, all partici-
pants are equal and share the computational complexity more equally. Depending on the
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application and the computational constraints of the actors involved in a use case, one or the
other of the two is more appropriate. In this paper, we focus on the first case, with a powerful
beacon operator offering its service to light-weight users.
While in early versions of randomness beacons of the first type, the beacon operator itself
needed to be trusted (i.e., it is an unbiased third party), with obvious implications for security,
recent literature has sought to design beacons where the need to trust the beacon operator is
reduced or removed entirely.
In keeping with this trend, we design and implement a randomness beacon that works
under the most pessimistic assumption possible: everybody (in particular, this includes the
beacon operator) is secretly colluding against the user and is willing to invest money and
resources towards manipulating or biasing the randomness. Specifically, we seek a design that
minimizes the trust required by a user and also allows each user to decide how much they
want to trust the beacon such that, a user will know that under self-chosen trust assumptions,
the randomness has not been manipulated.
Randomness beacons are of particular interest in the context of distributed ledgers and
smart contracts, steering the interaction of mutually distrusting parties. In such scenarios
trustworthy randomness can speed up computations and break symmetries. Although many
potential implementations and practical solutions are discussed in the literature on random-
ness beacons, very few actual implementations of public, general-purpose beacons have been
published or made available. We describe the design and deployment options for our random-
ness beacon on a smart contract platform and their implications.
In summary, this paper makes the following contributions. After a thorough threat analysis,
we design, implement and evaluate a practical, secure, and trust-minimizing randomness bea-
con based on the transparent authority model which relies on user input. The design captures
the requirements derived through the structured analysis of threats to a randomness beacon
and builds upon the unicorn protocol devised by Lenstra and Wesolowski [2], but can be
employed more generally. It allows users to send inputs and consume beacon values at any
time and at low overhead without a registration procedure. Our implementation relies on par-
allelized computation, which minimizes the possibility of malicious operation while avoiding
idle periods. Furthermore and unlike other approaches of transparent authorities, the beacon
operator in our beacon design has no private information: all inputs are hashed and are
released to the public in batches before the computation. The beacon also offers users to make
subtle decisions on when to trust the output. Our beacon uses Merkle trees as the data struc-
ture for inputs to reduce the computation proof size. Our experiments with a first prototype
demonstrate the scalability of our approach.
We further illustrate how this beacon can be deployed on distributed ledger platforms. We
compare different (partial) on- and off-chain deployment options and discuss our experience
and evaluation of Ethereum smart contracts for a lottery with our beacon.
To ensure reproducibility of our results as well as to facilitate follow-up work, we share our
implementations on https://github.com/randomchain/randbeacon.
Bibliographic note. A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the IEEE Block-
chain conference 2019 [13]. We extend this work with a security taxonomy and threat analysis,
an extended evaluation and a more thorough survey of related work.
2 Basic beacon concepts and related work
Randomness beacons and related functionality have been studied intensively in the literature
already, see [10–12, 14–20] for a list of but a few examples.
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The two main concepts of a random beacon concern its input and beacon operation. The
input describes what sources are used to calculate the beacon value, while the beacon operation
describes the design of the protocol, i.e. how to collect the input, perform the computation and
publish the output.
Input sources can be split into three categories. A beacon operator can use its private source
of data to produce randomness. This potentially allows users to consume randomness of high
quality at a high rate, but denies users access to inspect the process and thus requires users to
trust the beacon and its randomness. It does not align with our stated security goals, since the
beacon outputs cannot reliably be distinguished from carefully crafted values that appear to be
random. An example of this input source model is the NIST randomness beacon, developed
by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), which observes quantum
mechanical effects to produce what is claimed to be high-quality randomness [14, 16]. As
such, the users need to blindly trust the beacon operator, i.e., NIST in this case [21–23]. Bea-
cons based on publicly available sources cover input from sources that are publicly available
and which everyone can agree on the value of, e.g., financial data [18], lottery numbers [17] or
bitcoin block hashes [15, 19]. The users must trust the source to be sufficiently random, which
may be fine for the examples mentioned. Finally, beacons can also rely on user input in which
a user is allowed to directly provide input to the beacon. The idea is that a user provides a
value that they believe is sufficiently random. The beacon then performs an operation on the
set of user-supplied inputs, yielding an output that allows all users
1. to verify the inclusion of their input and
2. to verify the validity of the computation.
If these are satisfied, the user knows that a value they trust to be random has been part of
the random output generation. The computation performed by the beacon should ensure that
users cannot knowingly bias the output to anyone’s disadvantage. As such, users know their
input was not knowingly “counteracted” by another user.
We can distinguish between three models for beacon operation, detailed below. In the auto-
cratic collector model, a beacon is run by a party which requires blind trust from the users. As
such, the computation is a black box with no possibility for proof of honesty. An alternative is
to use specialized MPC where users utilize Multi-Party Computation (MPC) to collectively
produce randomness, typically from their own inputs. Given an honest majority, this type of
beacon produces randomness that is not biased against the participants. Despite significant
work in the field, this approach is difficult to scale to large groups since any addition or
removal of a user requires a new setup phase [10, 11, 20]. This type of beacon is therefore not
well-suited for public settings with vast numbers of users, but might fit in a controlled private
context. Finally, in a transparent authority model, a single entity collects inputs and publishes
them with a focus on transparency. Users can, by observing the beacon, verify that it behaves
according to the protocol. This does not directly prevent Byzantine behavior, but rather makes
it difficult to hide such behavior. This type also supports a wide variety of implementations,
and can be scaled to a public setting. In this paper, we focus on transparent authorities and
provide a scalable implementation of such a randomness beacon. One of its crucial advantages
is the fact that it does not require users to register or run any computationally intensive
operations.
The “zoo approach” [2], describes a protocol reminiscent of a beacon which collects data
from a variety of sources before running them through a verifiable delay function called sloth.
Sloth is a strictly sequential function which is orders of magnitude faster to inverse for verifica-
tion. The time-hardness prevents last-draw attacks, as attackers have to dedicate large amounts
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of time to compute how to bias the output, during which new inputs can render their efforts
pointless. The sloth delay function is a also key part of our randomness beacon. However, the
supporting structures driving the beacon are designed differently and we analyse the security
of both the protocol and the beacon operator in more detail; in particular, we assume the bea-
con operator can be malicious. A unicorn protocol is then used to combine input collection
from multiple sources and then compute the output of a delay function. This protocol resem-
bles that of the transparent authority beacon computation model, and is done by a single
entity. Lenstra and Wesolowski suggest feeding sloth with an aggregation of user inputs. Fur-
thermore, the authors present a protocol named trx, which utilizes the output of the unicorn
protocol. While they guarantee random unpredictable outputs even if all other users are mali-
cious, they do not explore the scenario of a malicious operator, who colludes with adversarial
users. We built upon their approach and design a system that can tolerate a malicious beacon
operator, while keeping the communication and computation cost for users low. Other
approaches that require users to register and entail a communication complexity of O(n2)
(e.g., [20]) and rely on the assumption of at most 1/3 Byzantine nodes in the system. In con-
trast, in our system users need to interact with the beacon operator two times, once to submit
their input and once to obtain the output. If they want to verify their input has been considered
and the output is valid, the complexity is in O(log n) due to the Merkle tree structure.
There exist other verifiable delay functions beyond sloth. Bünz et al. [19] evaluate the com-
putation and verification of delay functions based on modular square roots and the hashing
functions Keccak-256 (SHA3) and SHA-256. Subsequently, [24] formalized the notion and
present functions that achieve an exponential gap between evaluation and verification time.
Note that sloth could be replaced by these functions in our implementation and most likely
achieve better performance. Since the focus of this paper is on more general system aspects, we
omit an evaluation of these functions in this paper.
3 Threat analysis
We start by performing a threat analysis, considering possible threats to a generic randomness
beacon in order to understand the threat environment.
3.1 DREAD analysis
Our analysis assumes the user input model of input as well as a beacon based on the transpar-
ent authority model. In our setting, randomness is the fundamental resource that adversaries
would attempt to threaten and control. Thus we consider the availability and integrity of the
randomness beacon output to be the primary targets for attackers. We furthermore distinguish
between insiders and outsiders: an insider is anyone with the capabilities of the beacon operator
(for example the beacon operator itself), but for all intents and purposes may as well be anyone
gaining insider access to the beacon, e.g., by hijacking it. Because the beacon operator should
not be trusted either, we see no reason to distinguish between a legitimate beacon operator, a
malicious beacon operator, or an adversary maliciously acquiring access to the inside of the
beacon. In this context, an outsider is anyone who can only influence the beacon operation
from the outside network, and thus does not have inside access.
In order to structure our threat analysis, we employ the well-known DREAD framework
(with a slight modification commonly used) [25]. In this framework, potential threats are eval-
uated against five criteria and given a score on a simple scale 1 (indicating a low score) over 2
(indicating a medium score) to 3 (indicating a high score). The individual scores are based on a
qualitative assessment by the analyst. Threats are then assigned a final DREAD score, compris-
ing the sum of the individual scores, yielding a ranking of threats in which those with high
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(final) scores are those that are considered the most dangerous, i.e., attacks that can cause a lot
of damage and are (relatively) easy to carry out score higher than threats that are unlikely or
very difficult to realize. It is important to note that these scores are qualitative and abstract and
thus mainly useful for relative ranking of threats and should not be assigned any particular
quantitative interpretation. The five individual evaluation criteria are as follows
1. DAMAGE: How harmful would such an attack be? This includes considerations of breach of
safety, loss of privacy, financial loss.
2. REPRODUCIBILITY: How easy is it to reproduce such an attack? This includes robustness of
exploits (e.g. portability of attack across platforms and platform variations), (financial) cost
of performing an attack.
3. EXPLOITABILITY: How much (or rather, how little) work is required to launch the attack (with
the 3 being the least amount of work)? This includes the amount of preparation for an
attack, degree of specialisation needed for an attack, e.g., custom designed attacks.
4. AFFECTED USERS: How many users will be impacted? This is used as a rough measure of the
impact of the attack.
5. DISCOVERABILITY: How easy is it to discover the vulnerability? This is an estimate of the
amount of work and resources necessary to detect a vulnerability. Note that for some criti-
cal applications, it is recommended to assume the highest score for discoverability to avoid
“rewarding” security by obscurity. Indeed, most of the threats detailed below, have high dis-
coverability, as they are mostly obvious, but may be hard or expensive to implement.
Table 1 summarizes the findings of our threat analysis and in the following we will briefly
describe these in more detail, using a shorthand notation for indicating the (numerical) results
of our DREAD analysis, e.g., “Input Flooding
D R E A D S
2 3 2 3 3 13
”, where each of the cap-
ital letters refer to the corresponding DREAD category and S refers to the total DREAD score,
where anything equal to or above 12 is considered high risk.
3.1.1 Threats to availability. We start by describing some of the potential threats to avail-
ability. Such threats are often hard to protect against and can have serious consequences for
users and applications that depend on timely computation of random numbers.
• Shutdown
D R E A D S
2 2 2 3 3 12
A malicious beacon operator can shut the beacon down,
completely denying availability. This threat is impossible to prevent for a beacon run by a
single operator, although the beacon operator will likely not get away with it.
Table 1. Attacks and their DREAD score.
Insider Outsider




Eclipse select users (8)
Threats to integrity Input manipulation (14)
Leak output (14)
Emit false output (11)
Input biasing (12)
Output degradation (13)
Man in the middle (11)
Cyptography exploit (10)
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0232261.t001
PLOS ONE Breeding unicorns: Developing trustworthy and scalable randomness beacons
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0232261 April 28, 2020 5 / 22
• Withholding Output
D R E A D S
2 2 2 3 3 12
The operator can withhold outputs that are
not favorable to its interests. This threat is also quite significant and may be difficult to
detect/prove.
• Input Flooding
D R E A D S
2 3 2 3 3 13
Outsiders can overwhelm the beacon with inputs
to prevent other users from contributing their own input, or simply perform a Denial-of-
Service (DoS) attack on the beacon server. This is a serious threat as the attack is quite easy
to execute.
• Eclipsing (Select) Users
D R E A D S
2 1 1 1 3 8
An outsider can deny select users from
accessing the beacon to provide input or receive output. This is arguably a smaller threat, as
it is difficult to prevent a determined party from accessing the beacon, and such an eclipse
would still only affect that party.
• Eclipsing the Beacon
D R E A D S
2 1 1 3 3 10
An outsider can deny all users from provid-
ing input or receiving the output by infiltrating the inbound and outbound connection to
the beacon. This may be a difficult attack to execute, but if successful the outsider can poten-
tially eclipse the beacon from all users.
3.1.2 Threats to integrity. These threats can be far more damaging than threats to avail-
ability if not detected: Where availability is binary and users obviously cannot use a missing
output, successful integrity attacks provide an output, that appears legitimate, but is biased.
We consider using a biased output the worst thing for any user, which makes these threats
critical.
Input Biasing
D R E A D S
3 2 2 3 2 12
An outsider can provide input that biases the output to
their benefit. In this attack the outsider constructs an input such that it affects the output in
a known way despite other users contributing input later. If the outsider has the capability
of providing the last input, it may launch a last-draw attack. This is a severe threat to the
beacon, as the adversary is able to freely manipulate the output with their input, and violates
the unpredictability of the random number. The attack can be executed by anyone with
access to the input collectors given that they have the ability to pre-compute outputs.
Input Manipulation
D R E A D S
3 3 2 3 3 14
The operator can manipulate the input to bias
the output of the beacon. It can also selectively exclude inputs from certain users to deny
them availability. This threat is severe as the operator may manipulate the inputs, in a way
that cannot be detected. It is also easy for any operator capable of pre-computing the out-
put, and affects the randomness given to all users.
Output Degradation
D R E A D S
2 3 3 2 3 14
Adversaries can supply “bad” input to reduce
the quality of the output. This is also a serious threat as it will affect the quality of
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randomness provided to all users, a randomness which may not even be usable. In addition,
it is easy to do given access to the input collectors, and could even happen by accident.
Man in the Middle
D R E A D S
3 1 1 3 3 11
Adversaries can intercept and change data sent
between user and beacon. This threat could be significantly damaging but also extremely
hard to execute for adversaries. Due to the nature of beacons we recommend using them
when you need to agree on some random number—thus, to intercept and manipulate
inputs and outputs, the adversary would have to distribute the manipulated number to all
users, as they would otherwise disagree on the numbers, leading to the manipulation being
discovered.
Emitting False Output
D R E A D S
2 1 2 3 3 11
A malicious operator can output false results
of the computation that benefit him. While this is technically a threat to the integrity of the
beacon, the effects should be similar to those of a withholding attack. This is due to the fact
that simply publishing false output would rapidly be discovered in a transparent authority
beacon, making the output unusable, but also removing any faith in the operator.
Leaking Output
D R E A D S
3 3 2 3 3 14
The operator can give access to the output earlier to
some parties than others—potentially selling early access. This threat can be quite severe, as
we do not know how early access can be granted compared to when the randomness is
used. It also violates the unpredictability property of the beacon, and is easily executable for
any malicious operator of the beacon. In the worst case it would affect all users.
Cryptography Exploit
D R E A D S
3 2 1 3 1 10
Weaknesses or exploits may exist in the cryp-
tographic techniques that protect the beacon. While we estimate it will be hard to find such
exploits, hence the low discoverability score, they would likely be relatively easy to apply
once found, and would affect all users. In this case one might also consider the effect quan-
tum computers would have on the use of cryptography, which could also threaten the
beacon.
4 Design
This section describes our beacon design, aiming to mitigate the threats identified above.
4.1 Requirements
This section lists the requirements for a randomness beacon suitable for our security goals and
the threats that exist towards beacons. We decided on using the transparent authority type of
beacon, which requires a high level of transparency, and as such we build requirements on top
of that.
• Transparent Operation Users should be able to oversee that the beacon operates according to
the protocol and thus catch any deviations from it. Being able to verify whether their own
input has been used, allows users to determine whether they should trust the output. Fur-
thermore, users should be able to repeat the process on their own computers as a means of
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verification. This also requires the process to be deterministic. However, the output should
still be unpredictable, even to the beacon operator.
• Open and Secure Protocol Anyone should be able to easily contribute to the beacon protocol
to influence the random generation. There should be no requirements imposed on users to
limit their contribution rate besides denial of service protection. The protocol should be
secure meaning that even if only a single user is honest, the output is still unpredictable.
• Timely Publishing The protocol should enforce that input, output, and any data needed for
verification of an output is published as soon as possible to make the beacon more transpar-
ent. By having a requirement of timeliness at the protocol level, we restrict the time a mali-
cious operator has available to diverge from protocol before users will suspect them.
Giving users all the tools to replicate and oversee the process makes it difficult for adversaries
to covertly manipulate the beacon to their benefit, and allows users to complete output com-
putation themselves if the beacon stalls. This in turn mitigates one of the greatest threats
from the operator, input manipulation (see below). A beacon that does not reveal which
inputs were used before publishing the output will essentially be admitting that they picked
the inputs to bias the output.
We should note that despite having this property the beacon does not guarantee outputs on
any specific wall-clock time, e.g., at 12:00:00, 12:01:00, and 12:02:00. Instead, it will output as
soon as possible after each period of input collection. Barring any attacks, this will provide a
regular stream of outputs.
• Practicality Scalability of all components is important to be suitable for many use cases.
Therefore, it should scale to at least several thousand users contributing with user input in
every output. It will be beneficial to allow different channels for input and output, both to
make the beacon easier to access for users, but also to make it resilient to having any single
channel attacked. We also consider fault tolerance a valuable property to have, and having
multiple channels still allows users to input if one fails.
4.2 Service oriented architecture
To meet the requirements of modular input and output and fault tolerance, we use a service
oriented architecture (SOA) in the beacon design. This architecture splits the system into ser-
vices that each serve a single purpose. Communication between services is done according to a
well-defined protocol. In addition to scalability, a service oriented architecture provides loose
coupling and further simplifies fault tolerance since individual services can easily be
replicated.
A randomness beacon designed as a service oriented architecture consists of a number of
INPUT COLLECTOR services that collect input from many different sources. An INPUT PROCESSOR
service aggregates the input from all collectors and forwards it to the COMPUTATION service,
which commits to the aggregated input and runs the computation to generate an output.
Finally, various PUBLISHER services publish the commitment, output, and any relevant proofs to
different outlets. Fig 1 illustrates this architecture.
4.3 Security design
A major security concern is the operator’s ability to predict or manipulate the output. Our
solution for this problem is to ensure that each published output is paired with a commitment
which can be used in the verification of the beacon. As a novel design decision, the
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commitment must contain all data required for the computation and all inputs. This is differ-
ent from the approach based on a trusted operator where the operator can work with the
inputs [2]: In Unicorn, the beacon operator commits to an input that is revealed when publish-
ing the next output [2]. In order to replace the operator and implement it in a distributed way,
commits are useful.
The transparency allows any party, as a strategic choice, to compute the randomness along-
side the beacon operator. It ensures that the operator cannot cause much damage by withhold-
ing output or by deciding not to open a traditional, e.g., hashed commitment. This hence
reduces the “value” of the output: depending on the timing, it is less attractive to leak output,
i.e., sell early access to the output, as everyone can just compute it. Put differently, while this
does not prevent the operator of performing a withholding attack, it minimizes the effects of it.
Note that the user has a choice here: depending on the user’s preferences, it can choose to
invest more resources and compute the output from the commitment and obtain the valid out-
put itself; as a different design choice, the user may be fine with learning the output slightly
later but efficiently.
To further decrease the possibilities of the operator trying different commitments before
releasing them, we use a verifiable delay function. Delay functions can be seen as black
box functions that require a given amount of time to run and are inherently sequential, mean-
ing they cannot benefit from parallel execution. It ensures that the output cannot be instantly
computed, and that the operator cannot try more than one commitment before running out of
time. As such, the operator is unable to perform the input manipulation attack in a meaningful
way. In order to avoid excessive computation by users performing verification, delay functions
used in randomness beacons should be hard to compute and easy to verify, i.e., they must be
asymmetrically hard. The operator is of course able to exclude or change output, but not in a
way that knowingly benefits anyone because the effect of the manipulation is hidden behind
the delay function.
The delay function also protects against last-draw attacks, where an adversary attempts to
bias the output by crafting an input to produce favorable randomness. The adversary needs to
compute the result of adding a specific input as the last input. Delay functions make this signif-
icantly more difficult to attempt due to the time needed to compute the result. Given a delay
function that takes five minutes to complete, an adversary must dedicate five minutes of pro-
cessor time to any given input he attempts to use. This means he must dedicate large amounts
of resources to perform any significant number of attempts, and more importantly if a single
Fig 1. An abstract beacon architecture based on services. Solid boxes illustrate services and arrows represent data
flow.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0232261.g001
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input is added to the beacon within that five minute period, all of his work will be null, and he
will be forced to restart.
We use the delay function sloth [2]. As mentioned earlier, there is no secret input to the
delay function in our design. Note that in [2], a different attacker model is used. More pre-
cisely, the beacon operator wanted to safeguard against adversaries trying to manipulate the
outcome. In this work, we consider the beacon operator as potentially malicious. Therefore,
we proposed that the operator produced a commitment to a set of inputs, while also revealing
the inputs. This effectively means that anyone can calculate the delay function, and potentially
be faster than the operator. We deemed that by having the operator include a secret input, to
prevent anyone from computing the outcome before himself, the trust implications are too
severe, as a user would have to trust that the operator did not try multiple secret values in par-
allel and chose the most beneficial outcome. In our design, an adversary may know the out-
come earlier than an honest participant that waits for the beacon operator to announce it.
However, the adversary cannot bias the outcome, as long as there is at least one honest party.
This can hence be considered a design tradeoff, as everyone can learn about the output imme-
diately by investing the resources to compute the value once the commits are known.
Rational trust assumptions. In our approach we want to push beyond the need for honest
operators and naïve users. To achieve this we extend the work of [2] to quantify trusting the
beacon and determine thresholds for reasonable behavior when using delay functions. This
provides a measure of rational trust, where users decide for themselves if what they observe is
adequate.
We present a property which, if satisfied, means a user can trust that the beacon operator is
not capable of fooling them. This property is true if the user determines that nobody is able to
compute the delay function in the time between the users input and the user receiving the bea-
con’s commitment to the input for the delay function. This can be condensed to
tCOMMITMENT   tINPUT < TDELAY FUNCTION
where tINPUT is the time when the user sent the input, tCOMMITMENT is when the user received
the commitment, and TDELAY FUNCTION is the fastest computation of the delay function. So for
users to be more likely to trust a beacon, the time between sending the input and receiving the
commitment must be significantly smaller than the time between the commitment and the
output. In fact, it must be smaller than the shortest time the user thinks the operator could
compute the delay function.
An example could be that a user believes that the world’s fastest computer can compute the
delay function in two minutes. In this case the users can trust the output if they see a commit
to a set of inputs containing their input within two minutes of their input having been sent.
This relation between the time taken to compute the delay function and the time before a com-
mitment is seen allows users to flexibly adjust their willingness to trust the outcome has not
been biased against them.
A similar threshold is also described by [2], where they advise a ratio of no more than one
fifth of the computation time spent collecting inputs. In their paper, the authors furthermore
state that participants will always try to minimize the time between their input and the com-
mitment. We see this as potentially problematic, since such behavior can create congestion in
the system, which might result in some inputs not being used in the intended output computa-
tion. This means that users whose inputs were not included cannot trust the output of the
given beacon iteration.
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4.4 Parallelization
Taking all this into consideration we present a beacon operation protocol which can be
adjusted to increase or decrease the ratio and thereby the limit for probabilistic trust. The oper-
ation must be sequential which means that we must collect input before computing the delay
function. Accordingly, we propose to decouple input collection and computation, and to par-
allelize the latter. This means that several delay functions run in parallel, but are offset in time
and on different input, illustrated in Fig 2 (left).
We observe that no input collection is run in parallel nor overlapping, which resembles a
constant stream of input collection. In addition, the computation resources can be reused for
future beacon computations, thereby eliminating the need for spinning up new computation
services, as depicted in Fig 2 (left), where the beacon would output at each circle shown in the
diagram.
4.4.1 Number of computation nodes. The number of computation nodes at least
required in this fashion is given by the duration of the delay function divided by the duration
of input collection. As computational times typically vary slightly, this can cause the beacon
output to be more skewed compared to the initial output frequency. To remedy this, we
account for possible extra time δ for each delay function. In this case,




If, for example, the delay function is guaranteed to finish at most 2 minutes later than the
expected time of 10 minutes, i.e., a worst-case time of 12 minutes, and the input collection is 2
minutes, 6 nodes in total are necessary to guarantee a node is always ready every 2 minutes.
5 Prototype implementation
In this section we give a brief overview of the implementation of our beacon design. Our pro-
totype has been implemented mainly using Python 3 with a few subcomponents written in C
for performance.
The message passing infrastructure of our SOA is implemented using the ZeroMQ frame-
work for asynchronous message passing and concurrency (available at http://zeromq.org). We
can directly employ the “publish/subscribe” pattern provided by ZeroMQ between computa-
tion nodes and publisher. This pattern handles the message routing based on subscription pre-
fixes, resulting in less traffic on the network. Furthermore, the fan-in for input collectors is
implemented with a “push/pull” socket pair which ensures fair operation, thereby avoiding
starvation of components. Lastly, ZeroMQ guarantees atomic delivery of messages, which
means that we can assume all parts of a message or none at all.
Fig 2. Parallelized beacon protocol, with offset input collection (left) and stream input collection (right). Beacon
output is published after computation, last vertical lines (left) and circles (right).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0232261.g002
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To avoid implementing heavy service discovery functionality and to simplify configuration,
we deploy proxies at key points in the pipeline: one between input collectors and the input pro-
cessor and one between computation and publishers.
5.1 System interface
As previously mentioned, the system boundaries, i.e. where users and the outside world inter-
acts with the beacon, are handled by input collectors and publishers. We implement these and
the surrounding infrastructure, as well as vertical scaling if the load becomes too high on a sin-
gle component.
To limit the space of potential messages and message sizes passed around inside of our sys-
tem, we sanitize the user inputs by hashing them at the entry point with the SHA512 hashing
algorithm. Realistically, allowing any input could be seen as an invitation by some users to
post messages or even files, e.g. illegal or inappropriate content. Our choice of hashing at entry
point will mitigate this. Given a substantial number of users, receiving and hashing inputs may
become a costly affair performance-wise. Fortunately, the state of an input collector is only rel-
evant to a single input request, meaning that scaling and even distributing across many
machines is a trivial task. When we hash an input, as a convenience we return the hashed
input as a response. As such, they will later be able to confirm that their hashed input was used
in the output of the beacon. To allow users to verify correct hashing, the hashing algorithm
should be made publicly known. Currently we use the SHA512 hashing algorithm since its
digest size is 64 bytes, which gives us reasonably sized messages flowing through the system,
while still having 2512 possible different values. It could be argued that the 32 bytes of SHA256
are more than enough for any use case. However, SHA512 is actually roughly 1.5 times faster
than SHA256 on a 64-bit CPU [26]. Therefore, we see no reason to limit the possibilities to
2256, since we do not expect 512 bits per input to be too much data. We implement the system
such that the chosen hashing algorithm can be configured at beacon start.
5.2 Combining inputs
One of the most important tasks of our implementation is to combine the (hashes of the) col-
lected input both as a preparation for the computation phase, but also to derive commitment
data that can be verified by users. As a novel contribution, our implementation uses a Merkle
tree for this purpose. A Merkle tree is a special binary tree where the value of each node is the
hash of the concatenation of its two children; here the leaf nodes are the hashes of user inputs
and the root node is then the condensed output.
Merkle trees as commitment data allows third-party applications to provide verification,
since the inclusion of a given leaf node in a Merkle tree can be verified by providing all siblings
to the nodes on the path up to the root. This greatly limits the amount of data which the user
needs to fetch and process to O(log n) where n is the number of leaf nodes in a Merkle tree.
The commitment data consist of an ordered list of the leaf nodes.
Another property of the Merkle tree is that, like hashing a concatenation of all collected
inputs, each leaf node equally affects the root node, due to the diffusion property of the hashing
algorithm. This means that any change to the set of inputs changes the root node in the Merkle
tree.
5.3 Parallel computation
As discussed, we need parallel and time offset computations in the beacon. This is achieved by
letting the input processor handle the scheduling of computations: The beacon is configured
to process inputs at a lower bounded interval, which means that the input processor will send
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work at fixed times, given an available computation component. It should be noted that if no
such computational component is available, the input processor will just continue collecting
input. If no computation service becomes available within a given threshold, the input proces-
sor will give a warning to the system operator.
The worker announcements and subsequent work assignments are facilitated with Zer-
oMQ’s “router/dealer” socket pair which allows asynchronous addressed messaging. When a
computational node connects to the input processor it sends a READY message, receives an
OK , and proceeds to wait for incoming work; this process, accompanied by what follows
inside the computational node, can be seen in Algorithm 1. The input processor then keeps
track of each announced worker, and when the time comes, sends condensed processing out-
put and commitment data to the next free worker.
If the worker does not acknowledge the work with an OK response, the inputs are repro-
cessed, and the next free worker is assigned. This cycle continues until a worker accepts the
work, while new incoming inputs are included in each reprocessing of inputs. Having duplex
communication between the input processor and the computation nodes is a practical com-
promise between a strict pipeline pattern and a monolithic input processor/computation
node.
Algorithm 1 Specification of computational node outlining the communication pattern
with the input processor.
1 procedure INITIALIZATION()





7 if OK received before timeout then
8 W  RECEIVEWORK() . blocking call




13 wait for computation to finish








22 until the end of time
23 end proceodure
5.4 Delay function
For the computation phase we implement a delay function based on sloth, the function pro-
posed to be used in the unicorn protocol [2]. The general idea behind sloth is to iterate through
modular square root permutations of a large prime number and thereby construct a time hard
algorithm, while containing a trapdoor for fast reversal, i.e., verification. Essentially, the verifi-
cation calculates squares of the output from the computation. When implementing delay func-
tions in systems that rely on their time guarantees, it is important to focus on performance,
since an obvious yet undeployed optimization of execution time would compromise the “time
hardness” of the algorithm. We implement sloth as a Python module with a C-extension for
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the actual algorithm. In the C-extension the GNU MP library https://gmplib.org/ is used to
perform integer arithmetics with large numbers.
6 Performance evaluation
We conducted several experiments to explore potential system bottlenecks to gauge reasonable
throughput. We also investigate our chosen delay function sloth and different configurations
of it.
All experiments are executed on a server with an Intel Core i7-2600 CPU, which runs at
3.40 GHz. The server has four cores and can hence run 4 simultaneous sloth computations.
We use SHA512 as the hashing algorithm in both the Merkle tree and in the sloth delay
function.
6.1 Bottleneck analysis
We examine the potential bottlenecks which require the most effort to scale horizontally: the
proxies and the input processor.
6.1.1 Proxies. As discussed, our beacon contains two proxies. While the forward proxy
between computation and publishers is unproblematic in any real world randomness beacon
deployment (it only forwards outputs, commitments, and proofs), the stream proxy situated
between input collectors and input processors may become a bottleneck, as it has to handle a
constant stream of input messages. Recall that this proxy facilitates fan-in and fan-out pipelin-
ing with fair message distribution using a round-robin strategy. Hence, we test the throughput
of the proxy in different configurations of input collectors and input processors. For simplicity
and benchmark consistency, we utilize “dummy” components for this. The input collectors are
referred to as pushers and fan in at the proxy, while the input processors are called pullers and
fan out. In the tests we transmit messages which resemble those of an actual beacon in size, i.e.
64 bytes of application data plus any ZeroMQ packaging; in this case one byte which serves as a
flags field, and one byte to denote the message length.
In Fig 3 (left) we see how the aforementioned different configurations affect the throughput
of messages in the proxy. Firstly, every combination shows a throughput of at least 200k mes-
sages per second: likely sufficient even for popular real world beacons. It is the scenario of one
pusher to sixteen pullers that results in the lowest throughput, which can be caused by the
overhead of the fair message distribution enforcement. However, as we add pushers at sixteen
Fig 3. Configuration effect on throughput of messages in proxy. (Left) 64 bytes message throughput per second of
stream proxy, with different numbers of pullers and pushers. (Right) Correlation between number of leaves and the
time it takes to build a Merkle tree with those leaves.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journalpone.0232261.g003
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pullers, a slight increase in throughput can be seen, suggesting that fair distribution is easier
with more suppliers.
Another observation we can make from Fig 3 (left) is that increasing the number of pushers
does not affect the throughput as much as adding pullers does. This illustrates that fan-out is a
considerably more expensive task than fan-in—a fortunate fact, since a deployment of our bea-
con most likely will consist of remarkably more pushers than pullers.
We can conclude that the proxies in our system are unlikely to be bottlenecks, and we
should rather look further down the pipeline for issues; hence we next examine the input
processor.
6.1.2 Input processor—Building merkle trees. The most expensive task in our input pro-
cessor is building the Merkle tree. This task is done periodically when it is time to compute a
new random output. It is critical that this computation is fast, as this step can extend the time
between the last seen input and publishing the commitment. As such, we examine how the
number of leaves, i.e. inputs, affects the building time of the Merkle tree. In Fig 3 (right), a lin-
ear growth in build time is seen as a factor of the number of leaves. The growth is slow and is
negligible in our beacon. Well over 2M leaves are needed to result in a build time over 3s.
Admittedly, the build time could be a problem if significantly many inputs are used. How-
ever, in this case one might reimplement the input processor in a more performant language
than Python, e.g., C. In addition, the construction of Merkle trees is trivially parallelized. Our
evaluation results presented here do not take advantage of this fact. Thus building subtrees in
multiple processes and merging them to form the final tree provide a significant speed-up with
a factor close to the number of available CPU cores.
6.2 Sensitivity analysis of sloth
The computation and verification time of the delay function, sloth, can be configured by
adjusting two parameters: (1) the number of bits of the prime number used in the computa-
tion; and (2) the number of times to iterate through the permutation process of said prime.
To evaluate the sloth delay function and its sensitivity on the parameters, we run a series of
tests of the algorithm. During the tests we sample multiple rounds with random inputs and
take the average. Fig 4 (left) illustrates the correlation between the two parameters, and the
time it subsequently takes to do a computation with a given combination of bits and iterations.
An increase in the number of bits used for the prime number results in an exponential growth
of the computation time, while an increase in number of iterations cause a linear growth.
Fig 4. Execution time of sloth computation and verification with different parameters. (Left) Bits and iterations vs
time of computation. (Right) Computation time vs verification time with the logarithmic z-axis.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journalpone.0232261.g004
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While computation time is important for the delay function, another significant metric is
verification time—especially in relation to the computation time. Fig 4 (right) illustrates this
relationship, where the z-axis shows how many more times it takes to compute the output rela-
tive to how long it takes to verify. Although the data is more scattered than in the previous fig-
ure, we see a trend where the growth of this factor levels out just above one hundred. This
means that in configurations with more than roughly 3K iterations, the computation time is
always more than two orders of magnitude larger than the verification time.
We also observe that the number of bits does not affect the factor except for some irregular-
ities in the data. These irregularities are caused by the extra time it potentially can take to ini-
tially find the prime number; an operation which can vary in time depending on how close the
numeric representation of the hashed input string is to a prime. Since larger primes (given by
number of bits) can be more difficult to find, the data fluctuates more at larger number of bits.
7 Blockchain applications and implementations
The big promise of blockchains is to facilitate business interactions between mutually distrust-
ing parties, ranging from virtual currency transfers to smart contracts, enabling the trusted
execution of arbitrary code. More precisely, the tamperproof nature of an append-only distrib-
uted ledger realized by a blockchain protocol, forms the basis for platforms to run smart con-
tracts. In essence, a smart contract is a piece of code stored at an address on the ledger.
Sending a message to this address triggers the execution of the code with the arguments in the
message, and the resulting state is stored on the ledger. A blockchain consensus protocol
ensures that all parties agree on the operations and their sequence, as well as the resulting
state, despite the presence of malicious participants and the lack of trust.
Since randomness beacons let parties that do not trust each other base decisions on a
trusted source of randomness, we study the implications of an implementation of our beacon
in a blockchain environment. Smart contracts between mutually distrusting parties can benefit
from unbiased trustworthy randomness to speed up computations and break symmetries, e.g.,
in games. Since openness to any users is key in our design, an implementation providing ran-
domness on a public permissionless blockchain, which allows any interested entity to partici-
pate, makes most sense. We first compare different implementation options and then report
on a blockchain-based implementation of a lottery application using our beacon.
7.1 Design choices
There are essentially two options for the implementation:
• The actual beacon operator is run as a smart contract.
• The beacon operator runs separately from the blockchain, but publishes some of its artifacts
as part of smart contract on the blockchain.
While a fully blockchain-based solution offers benefits in terms of decentralization (no sin-
gle point of trust/failure, more robust to attacks including DoS, . . .), this solution is costly as
each computation in the smart contract consumes virtual currency. This ties the beacon into
the monetary incentive structures that dictate smart contract behavior. Due to the high cost,
this option requires many users to compensate for the large on-chain computation cost.
The second implementation option offers several variants with different trade-offs. The ver-
ification can, for example, be done either on-chain in a smart contract, or by each interested
user on their own. This has the advantage that expensive on-chain computations are avoided.
Which artifacts and computation are on-chain and what parameter size are appropriate is an
application-specific tradeoff between security and costs.
PLOS ONE Breeding unicorns: Developing trustworthy and scalable randomness beacons
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0232261 April 28, 2020 16 / 22
E.g., storage cost is proportional to the size of data stored on-chain, thus storing (parts of
the) data off-chain, e.g., one blockchain-backed distributed hashtables or IPFS, may provide a
solution with some guarantees that tampering with the commitment and output will be
detected, yet with a lower price tag.
The time necessary for a proposed transaction to be in a block that can be considered
immutable may be highly variable depending on the nature of the underlying blockchain.
Since the time interval between submitting an input and receiving a commitment from the
beacon operator is the basis of trust for a user, the blockchain latency must be taken into
account when configuring the delay function. Moreover the variability of the blockchain
latency may tarnish the trust assumption of users. In addition, since parts of the beacon would
still be off-chain, those parts will depend on an operator and are vulnerable to DoS attacks.
We study a lottery application based on our beacon, and to compare different implementa-
tions more systematically, we consider the following 3 players:
• Owner—Runs the lottery (e.g., smart contract owner)
• User—Takes part in the lottery by sending a small payment to the lottery smart contract
• Beacon—Beacon operator that provides a random value for the drawing of a lucky winner
The main goal of the lottery owner is to shave off some of the users’ participation payments
as a reward. In other words, not all of the user payments are given to the lucky winner, some of
it is transferred to the lottery owner. Users only want to participate in a lottery when they have
a reason to trust that the random value provided by the beacon is not biased, i.e., if they sent
some input to the beacon to influence the generated random value and received a commitment
within their trust time bound (on or off-chain).
We consider the following implementations, ordered by increasing on-chain smart contract
complexity:
• Maximum off-chain (OFF): In this implementation all beacon-related logic is off-chain: only
the lottery logic is on-chain. The users send their inputs to the beacon off-chain and obtain
the commitment off-chain. Thereafter they send the lottery payment to the smart contract.
When the off-chain beacon value computation has finished, the lottery smart contract
fetches the value with an oracle. Using this value, it then determines the winner of the lottery.
Users can verify if the beacon matches the commitment and complain off-chain and decide
not to trust this beacon in the future. This has no influence on the outcome of the current
draw of the lottery. Both the owner and the winning user receive rewards through the execu-
tion of the smart contract, while the beacon operator is remunerated off-chain.
• Adding beacon incentive and on-chain commitment (ITV): To allow the beacon operator to
be compensated with the smart contract, the following changes can be made to the simple
contract proposed above. In a first step, the beacon publishes its public key and a nonce and
locks some funds in the smart contract. Users send their input to the beacon off-chain and
once they see their input included in the commitment, they send (i) the Merkle tree root
signed by the beacon operator together with the nonce locked earlier and (ii) their participa-
tion payment to the smart contract. In this scenario, the beacon operator submits the next
beacon value to the smart contract directly or it is fetched with an oracle call. The verification
of the correct execution of sloth on the Merkle root is performed on-chain. The beacon loses
its locked funds if verification fails. If the verification succeeds, the owner, beacon and win-
ner receive rewards.
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• On-chain inputs (INP): This version moves the input inclusion verification done by the user
in the previous versions to the smart contract. In this case the user can send their input on-
chain together with the lottery payment and it is then up to the beacon operator to send the
corresponding commitment in time to avoid losing its locked funds. Thus the user does not
have to worry about the commitment after selecting an input. Verification and reward distri-
bution is analogous to ITV. To reduce the cost for on-chain memory and computation, a
sequential commit representation is advantageous in this and the following variant.
• Optimistic (OPT): Since verification is costly and needs to be paid by the smart contract
owner, the beacon operator and the users, another option is to add a complaint phase instead
of carrying out the verification computation for every draw. In this case, an entity can submit
evidence within a certain time frame to the smart contract that shows that the beacon value
has not been computed correctly. Upon the successful verification of the evidence, this entity
then receives part of the beacon funds currently stored in the contract, the beacon loses its
funds and all users get reimbursed an equal fraction of the remaining beacon funds and their
lottery fees. If the complaint phase expires without such evidence being presented, the value
is assumed to be valid and the winner, owner and beacon operator are rewarded
correspondingly.
The different variants as well as their advantages and disadvantages are summarized in
Table 2.
7.2 Implementation and evaluation
We have implemented an Ethereum smart contract for the OFF and ITV models (INP and
OPT are very similar to ITV from an implementation point of view) on a private test network
and analyzed the gas costs for the implementations. In both the cases, the smart contract uses
an oracle service to obtain the necessary data from the beacon.
Fig 5 shows the gas costs for fetching the value from the beacon and drawing a winner for
different number of users in the lottery, for the OFF model. As expected, we observe a linear
increase of the gas cost with number of users.
The main implementation difference between the OFF and the other variants is the fact
that in the later, the verification computation can be done on-chain. Thus we compute the gas
requirements for the verification (modular squaring for sloth verification) in isolation. Using
delay functions that require modular squaring for verification in smart contracts is discour-
aged [19], owing to the high gas consumption. But the addition of a ‘pre-compiled’ contract to
perform modular exponentiation as a part of EIP198 [27] significantly reduces the gas cost
required to perform verification. The gas needed for modular exponentiation can be calculated
based on the formula given in [27].
Table 3 shows the gas requirements for sloth verification performed for different sizes of
witness, prime modulus and number of iterations. The values in the last row of the table show
that for the largest evaluated witness and modulus sizes, the sloth verification cost amounts to
around 5 times the cost for the rest of the smart contract with 70 users. For ITV and INP the
lottery smart contract owner must set the participation fee high enough to be able to make a
profit despite the verification cost. In the OPT variant, the verification computations are only
executed on chain if someone submits a complaint. Thus with OPT, the owner can set a much
lower participation fee as long as the locked funds by the beacon can cover the bounty and the
computation cost of a successfully verified complaint.
Note that in addition to the increase due to sloth verification computation, the amount gas
required for parsing, preprocessing and validating beacon inputs, commitments, output and
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proof parameters including their signatures on chain has to be considered. Parsing and pre-
processing can be done in multiple ways (e.g., by making multiple calls to the oracle to obtain
each value individually, or making a single call and parse the returned data on-chain, and so
on). It also depends on how the beacon values are encoded when sent to the contract. In
Table 2. Lottery implementation options using the transparent randomness beacon.
Delay Function on-chain Delay Function off-chain, growing contract complexity
Step\Version Full on-chain beacon OFF ITV INP OPT
Preprocessing - - Beacon locks fund and
nonce on-chain (to be
released if not enough users
participate within a certain
time frame)
Like ITV Like ITV
User Input On-chain, together with
lottery fee payment





Not necessary Off-chain. After users see
their input committed in
time, they send lottery fee
payment
Users send Merkle root
obtained off-chain (with
beacon signature on root
and nonce) with lottery fee
payment to contract
Commitment is stored on-
chain, if delivered timely
and including all inputs in
the commitment, else users





On-chain Off-chain, independent of
lottery
Off-chain, after
commitment is stored on-
chain.
Like ITV Like ITV
Beacon
Output
On-chain Store beacon value on-chain Like OFF Like OFF Like OFF
Post-
processing
- User verify beacon and
complain off-chain, may
decide to not trust this
lottery in the future (no




beacon forfeits funds and
users get lottery fees back
Like ITV If evidence submitted by
user, on-chain verification,
if successful, users receive
beacon funds and lottery
fees, beacon forfeits funds
Reward Owner and winning user
receive rewards
Owner and winning user
receive rewards
Owner, beacon and winning
user receive rewards
Like ITV Like ITV
Pros Users do not have to worry
about verification
Simple to implement, low
gas consumption
Beacon compensated for its
service
Beacon compensated, user




on chain if someone
complains




without delay functions are
possible for this scenario
Owner and user must know
and adhere to timing of
beacon, trust stems from
incentives to repeat lottery
execution. Beacon operator
remunerated off-chain.
User interacts with off-chain
beacon operator and smart
contract. All honest users
submit the same data.
Verification executed on-
chain for every draw
Verification executed on-
chain for every draw, even
though the beacon would
typically be incentivised to
be honest in this scenario
User must execute
verification off-chain fast
enough to react within the
complaint window
https://doi.org/10.1371/journalpone.0232261.t002
Fig 5. OFF gas consumption for different number of users.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journalpone.0232261.g005
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addition to this, the gas costs to use the oracle service depends on the amount of data fetched.
However, this part of the gas cost is dominated by far by the verification cost, so we do not
report on these numbers.
7.3 Discussion
When using a blockchain to run (parts of) a randomness beacon, the incentive structure of all
involved parties needs to be considered in a security analysis, which may include miners in
public permissionless blockchains. As an example, for the trust assumption of everyone being
against the user, the user would have to mine blocks to guarantee interaction with the beacon,
which is a steep requirement.
We also note that using smart contracts interacting with an off-chain beacon, a beacon can
also be used on a deeper level of a distributed ledger, namely as a means to speed up consensus
with shared randomness. If all the members in a distributed environment trust and agree on
the random value generated by the beacon, it can be used to select leaders, committees and/or
rank block proposals in an otherwise trust-lacking blockchain scenario. Recent consensus
algorithms leverage this idea [28, 29] with MPC beacon generation. If and how a transparent
authority beacon can be applied in this context is an interesting open question.
8 DREAD robustness analysis
Before concluding, we revisit the threats a randomness beacon is exposed to and discuss how
our proposed solution addresses them. Regarding the availability of a randomness beacon we
identified the following threats: beacon shutdown, withholding output, input flooding, beacon
and user eclipsing. In our design, the beacon operator’s role is to provide a service on behalf of
the users, yet each of the users could replace the beacon. Thus a beacon shutdown or withhold-
ing attack is more an inconvenience than a severe threat once the input has been submitted. If
the beacon or part of it is implemented on a smart contract platform, as proposed in the previ-
ous setting, the availability of the chosen platform is crucial for the availability of the beacon.
With respect to input flooding, the stream proxies mitigates this threat to some extent as it sep-
arates the computation from the input processing and state-of-the-art load balancing and DOS
prevention measures can be implemented for them. When implementing the input collection
part of the beacon on-chain (option INP, OPT or full), the DOS resistance of the blockchain
platform is inherited, which also holds for the eclipsing attacks.
Input manipulation, output degradation, man-in-the-middle, false or leaking output and
cryptographic exploits threaten the integrity of randomness beacons, The integrity of our solu-
tion relies on cryptographic assumptions and thus input manipulation, output degradation
and biasing are only possible if the assumptions do not hold or if the design and implementa-
tion of the cryptographic primitives contain bugs that can be exploited. State-of-the-art man in
the middle prevention mechanisms should be used for crucial applications (not implemented
in our version, since this is not the focus of this paper). Since the beacon output can be verified,
false output can be detected. In the case of a blockchain implementation according to the
Table 3. Verification gas cost for different parameter sizes.
Size of Witness (bits) Size of Prime Modulus (bits) Iterations Gas
512 512 1024 159,129
1024 1024 1024 517,171
512 512 2048 368,844
1024 1024 2048 1,198,745
https://doi.org/10.1371/journalpone.0232261.t003
PLOS ONE Breeding unicorns: Developing trustworthy and scalable randomness beacons
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0232261 April 28, 2020 20 / 22
options ITV, INP, OPT false output can be punished with a forfeited deposit, while a correct
full on-chain implementation guarantees a correct output. Leaking output to interested parties
earlier is possible, yet the value of it is questionable, since every party could compute it itself if
willing to carry the cost.
9 Conclusion
We designed, implemented and evaluated a randomness beacon with sensible guarantees for
any single user; i.e. given their random input to the beacon, they can easily and rapidly verify
the computation, and decide if they deem it trustworthy. Our implementation allows all users
to run the delay function in parallel or instead of beacon operator, thus mitigating the effect of
a (maliciously or inadvertent) output withholding attack. Our beacon is attractive for applica-
tions based on smart contracts and distributed ledgers with minimal trust assumptions, illus-
trated with an Ethereum lottery application.
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